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In November 2018, the United States Department of Education (“DOE”) released a set of 
Title IX regulations aimed at reforming how public universities conduct Title IX procedures.1  The 
proposed regulations (“2018 regulations”) endeavored to improve how universities address 
allegations of sexual assault and sexual harassment by requiring procedural due process 
protections, such as live hearings and cross-examination procedures.2 The 2018 regulations 
mirrored the Sixth Circuit’s 2018 holding in Doe v. Baum.3  In Baum, the court held that public 
universities must provide an accused student or the accused student’s representative with the 
opportunity to cross-examine the complainant and adverse witnesses.4  This procedural shift 
incited significant controversy, as critics argued that universities would now resemble a “quasi-
legal system” that would burden universities and ultimately, harm students.5 
Amidst this controversy, in Haidak v. University of Massachusetts-Amherst  the First 
Circuit departed from the Sixth Circuit’s categorical rule in Baum, holding that the cross-
examination of a complainant and adverse witnesses by a neutral third party satisfies student due 
 
* 2021 J.D. Candidate at Seton Hall Law School and graduate of College of the Holy Cross. I would like to thank 
Professor Thomas Healy for his guidance.  
1 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Secretary DeVos: Proposed Title IX Rule Provides Clarity for Schools, Support 
for Survivors, and Due Process Rights for All (Nov. 16, 2018) (on file with  U.S. Dep’t of Educ.) (hereinafter 2018 
Press Release). 
2 Id.  
3 Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2018). 
4 Id. 
5 See Andrew Kreighbaum, College Groups Blast DeVos Title IX Proposal , INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/31/higher-ed-groups-call-major-changes-devos-title-ix-rule. 
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process rights in Title IX matters relating to sexual misconduct.6  Baum and Haidak’s conflicting 
holdings present a new lens for analyzing student due process rights in Title IX grievance 
procedures, particularly in sexual misconduct matters.  Further, in reconciling the two cases the 
First Circuit’s holding presents a workable solution that should inform how universities and 
policymakers address student due process rights in Title IX sexual misconduct matters. The 2018 
regulations are still being finalized and it is unknown when they will be released.7 Regardless of 
the DOE’s finalized Title IX regulations, litigation in this area will continue to be a subject of 
intense scrutiny and university policies will need to continually adapt.  The Haidak holding offers 
important guidance as universities and policymakers determine how to fairly balance a student’s 
right to be heard and a student’s right to an education free from sexual assault and harassment.   
This Comment is intended to assist universities, legal advisors, educational institutions, 
and policymakers in navigating current confusion surrounding due process rights in Title IX sexual 
misconduct matters, specifically procedural due process requirements for university proceedings 
or hearings.  Part II of this Comment will provide a brief history of Title IX regulations and how 
Title IX regulations have evolved to address sexual misconduct at public universities.  Part II will 
further explain student due process rights through an explanation of key case law and conclude by 
describing the current tension between Title IX regulations and student due process rights.  Part 
III will analyze the conflicting holdings in Baum and Haidak.  Part IV will argue that the First 
Circuit’s holding in Haidak, through its analysis of a university’s cross-examination procedures in 
 
6 Haidak v. Univ. of Massachusetts-Amherst, No. 18-1248, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 23482 (1st Cir. Aug. 6, 2019). 
7 See Sarah Brown and Katherine Mangan, What You Need to Know about the Proposed Title IX Regulations, THE 
CHRON. OF HIGHER ED. (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/What-You-Need-to-Know-
About/245118; Christopher Carusone and Kate Emert Gleason, Correspondence Encourages the DOE Not to 






a sexual misconduct matter, presents a workable solution to current concerns regarding student 
due process rights in Title IX sexual misconduct matters. Part V will briefly conclude.  
 
II. The Evolution of Title IX Regulations and Student Due Process Rights in Sexual Misconduct 
Matters 
This Section will first provide background on Title IX regulations and how the regulations 
address sexual misconduct.  Second, this Section will explain key case law regarding student due 
process rights.  Finally, this Section will conclude by addressing the relationship between Title IX 
regulations and student due process rights.  
A. Background on Title IX Regulations Regarding Matters of Sexual Assault and Sexual 
Harassment 
The U.S. Congress passed Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 on June 23, 
1972.8   Congress passed Title IX in response to the educational inequality experienced by women 
prior to the 1970s.9  Title IX prohibits discrimination “on the basis of sex in education programs 
and activities operated by recipients of federal financial assistance.”10  Schools are responsible for 
“taking steps to prevent sex-based discrimination, including sexual harassment, and for responding 
quickly and effectively to harassment when it occurs.”11 
Focusing on Title IX’s regulations pertaining to sexual assault and harassment, the United 
States Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) issued further guidance in 1997.12  The guidance, titled 
“Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Others Students, 
 
8 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUCATION, EQUAL ACCESS TO EDUCATION: FORTY YEARS OF TITLE IX (2012).  
9 Id.  
10 Id.  
11 Id.  
12 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUCATION OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF 
STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES (1997). 
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or Third Parties,” emphasized legal authority which established the sexual harassment of students 
as a form of sex discrimination covered by Title IX.13  Under this guidance, teachers and 
administrators must recognize instances of sexual harassment, take prompt action to end the 
harassment, and prevent it from reoccurring.14  The OCR’s guidance underscored that schools 
retained flexibility in designing procedures for responding to sexual misconduct as long as those 
procedures were reasonable and similar to how the school would respond to other types of serious 
misconduct.15 
Subsequent Supreme Court cases confirmed the duty of schools to effectively address 
sexual harassment and sexual misconduct by both students and teachers in order to create a safe 
school environment.16  Following these Supreme Court cases, in 2001 the OCR published revised 
guidance for schools that provided information and examples to assist schools in determining if 
sexual harassment occurred.17  Further, the OCR attempted to clarify how a school’s response to 
sexual misconduct allegations would be evaluated under Title IX regulations.18  Specifically, the 
OCR emphasized that a school’s response to allegations of sexual misconduct would be measured 
by a “reasonableness” standard in which “[s]chools do not have to know beforehand that their 
response will be effective. However, if their initial steps are ineffective in stopping the harassment, 
reasonableness may require a series of escalating steps.”19  The OCR also recognized the due 
process rights of individuals by stating that schools must recognize due process rights “consistent 
 
13 Id. 
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998);  Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 
(1999). 
17 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: 
HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES  (2001) (hereinafter 2001 




with any federally guaranteed due process rights involved in a complaint proceeding” but that 
schools “should ensure that steps to accord due process rights do not restrict or unnecessarily delay 
the protections provided by Title IX to the complainant.”20 
Schools were also required to adopt and publish a policy outlining grievance procedures 
for sex discrimination and sexual misconduct.21  These grievance procedures had to be “prompt 
and equitable” and provide an “effective measure for preventing and responding to sexual 
harassment.”22  In evaluating whether a school’s response to sexual harassment was “prompt and 
equitable” the OCR would consider:  
(1) notice to students, parties, and employees of the grievance procedure; (2) 
application of the procedure to complaints alleging harassment; (3) adequate, 
reliable, and impartial investigation of complaints, including the opportunity to 
present witnesses and other evidence; (4) clear timelines for the major stages of the 
complaint process; (5) notice to parties of the outcome of the complaint; and (6) an 
assurance that the school will take steps to prevent a reoccurrence of the 
harassment.23  
 
Later, in 2011, the OCR issued a “Dear Colleague Letter” (“DCL”) that supplemented its 
2001 guidance.24  The OCR emphasized that the DCL was intended to provide further guidance 
regarding how the DOE would evaluate a school’s compliance with its legal obligations under 
Title IX.25  Importantly, the DCL required schools to use a preponderance of evidence standard (it 
is more likely than not that sexual harassment or violence occurred) when responding to allegations 
of sexual misconduct.26  At the time, some schools followed a “clear and convincing” evidence 
standard (highly probable or reasonably certain that the sexual harassment or violence occurred).27  
 
20 See 2001 Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 17. 
21 Id.  
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter (Apr. 4, 2011), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf (hereinafter Dear College Letter). 
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 Id. 
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The DCL stated that the “clear and convincing” standard was inconsistent and not equitable under 
Title IX.28 
The DCL also outlined how schools should facilitate sexual misconduct proceedings, in 
particular, hearings.29  The guidance explained that parties must be provided an equal opportunity 
to present relevant witnesses and evidence through a hearing or another mechanism.30  The DCL 
opposed allowing parties to personally question or cross-examine each other because such 
procedures “may be traumatic…possibly escalating or perpetuating a hostile environment” that the 
hearing sought to remedy.31  Additionally, schools were encouraged to establish an appeals 
process.32  
On September 22, 2017, the DOE withdrew the 2011 DCL, as well as a 2014 OCR  
document titled “Questions and Answers on Title XI and Sexual Violence,” because the guidance 
“led to the deprivation of rights for many students—both accused students denied fair process and 
victims denied an adequate resolution of their complaints.”33  Specifically, the DOE claimed that 
the 2011 and 2014 guidance did not adhere to fundamental standards of fairness because both 
adopted a minimal standard of proof (the preponderance of the evidence standard), discouraged 
cross-examination by the parties, and prioritized the efficient resolution of Title IX complaints 
over affording parties due process protections.34 Instead, the DOE directed schools to follow its 
2001 guidance until final regulations were released under Secretary of Education, Betsy Devos.35  
 
28 See Dear College Letter, supra note 24. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 







The DOE’s 2001 guidance required “prompt and equitable” grievance procedures that included 
adequate notice to students as well as the opportunity to present witnesses and other evidence.36 
B. Student Due Process Rights  
Public institutions must adhere to Title IX requirements in order to receive federal funding, 
but also must consider due process rights guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution.37  Importantly, 
due process requirements only apply at public universities, while Title IX and DOE regulations 
apply to all universities.38 When courts analyze a question of due process rights, the analysis 
typically proceeds in a two-step manner.39  First, the court evaluates whether due process applies 
(whether a person’s life, liberty, or property is being put at risk because of something the 
government is doing).40  Second, if the person is entitled to due process, the court determines what 
process is due under the specific circumstances.41  In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court 
held that the process that is due depends largely on context and three factors: (1) what is at stake 
for the person; (2) how risky it is under the current procedures for the person to be wrongly 
punished and how likely is it that safeguards would reduce that risk; and (3) how costly and time 
consuming the new protections would be for the government.42 
The Supreme Court followed the Mathews framework in its first major holding on students’ 
due process rights in Goss v. Lopez.43  In Goss, students who faced short suspensions brought a 
class action against school officials, contending that due process required hearings prior to the 
 
36 See 2001 Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 17. 
37 FIRE’s Guide to Due Process and Campus Justice, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUC. (Dec. 13, 2013), 
https://www.thefire.org/research/publications/fire-guides/fires-guide-to-due-process-and-campus-justice/fires-guide-
to-due-process-and-fair-procedure-on-campus-full-text/ [bereinafter FIRE’s Guide]. 
38 Id. 
39 Id.  
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
43 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
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enactment of a suspension.44  The Court reasoned that public education was a property interest 
protected by the Due Process Clause45 and that a student’s liberty is at stake when the student’s 
good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is being questioned.46  Further, the Court articulated that 
the “fundamental requisite of due process is the opportunity to be heard,” and students were 
entitled to “some kind of notice” and “some kind of hearing.”47  
The Court considered the costs schools would face if student disciplinary procedures 
followed common law trials and required that “there be at least an informal give-and-take between 
student and disciplinarian, preferably prior to the suspension.”48  Therefore, in the context of a 
short suspension, under Goss, schools are not required to facilitate the production of evidence, the 
opportunity for cross-examination, legal representation for the parties, or an appeal procedure.49  
The Court did note that due process “may require more formal procedures” in more serious cases.50 
Since Goss, lower federal courts and various state courts have grappled on a case-by-case 
basis with the issue of when more “formal procedures” may apply to school disciplinary 
proceedings.51  There have been no higher court decisions to clarify the types of procedures 
necessary.52  According to the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, the “principle firmly 
established by these federal and state courts is that the amount of due process required in campus 
disciplinary cases must be based on the particular nature and gravity of the charges and 
circumstances.”53  Case law suggests that courts are hesitant to second-guess the disciplinary 
 
44 Id. at 568. 
45 Goss, 419 U.S. at 574. 
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 579. 
48 Id. at 584. 
49 Id. at 583. 
50 Goss, 419 U.S. at 584. 
51 FIRE’s Guide, supra note 37. 
52 Id.  
53 Id. 
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decisions made by education institutions.54  Further, due process is intended to be flexible and the 
“establishment of a one-size-fits-all rules would be contrary to the constitutional premise that one  
has a right only to the process that is ‘due.’”55 
C. The Relationship Between Title IX Regulations and Student Due Process Rights 
The relationship between Title IX regulations and student due process rights is complicated 
and controversial, especially in sexual misconduct matters.56  Despite the relative flexibility 
schools have in developing procedural protections for student due process rights, many criticized 
and continue to criticize the 2011 DCL as a serious threat to student due process rights.57  For 
example, in 2016, the American Association of University Professors (“AAUP”) wrote a report 
that raised significant concerns about the implications of the 2011 DCL.58  The AAUP’s concerns 
included: (1) whether education institutions are the right forum to hear sexual assault cases; (2) 
whether altering the evidence standard to a “preponderance of evidence” deprives the accused of 
a fair hearing; and (3) whether a mandated procedure that negates the right to cross-examine one’s 
accuser violates due process.59 
The controversy surrounding the 2011 DCL letter prompted the DOE to withdraw the 2011  
DCL in 2017 and in 2018, propose a revised set of Title IX regulations.60  The DOE stated that its 
2018  regulations would improve university responses to sexual assault and harassment by 
 
54 See Fern L. Kletter, Schools Violation of Student’s Substantive Due Process Rights by Suspension or Expelling 
Student, 90 A.L.R. 235 (2013). 
55 FIRE’s Guide, supra note 37.  
56 See Audrey Wolfson Latourette, Title IX Office of Civil Rights Directives: An Assault Against Due Process and 
First Amendment Rights, 23 J. OF LAW, BUS. & ETHICS 1 (2017). 
57 Id.  
58 The History, Uses, and Abuses of Title IX, AM. ASSOC. OF UNIV. PROFESSORS (June 2016), 
https://www.aaup.org/report/history-uses-and-abuses-title-ix. 
59 Id. 
60 See Proposed Amendments to Title IX Education Amendments of 1972, 34 C.F.R. Part 106 (proposed Nov. 29, 
2018). 
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ensuring transparency and consistency in Title IX grievance proceedings.61  The DOE explained 
that one means of increasing transparency and consistency in Title IX grievance proceedings 
would be through due process protections for students in the form of live hearings and new cross-
examination procedures that would be conducted by the complainant’s and respondent’s advisor 
of choice.62 
The 2018 regulations were highly scrutinized.63  Between the release of the regulations in 
November 2018, and the DOE’s public comment period ending in February 2019, over 100,000 
comments were filed.64  Some were concerned that the 2018 regulations relied too heavily on 
formal legal procedures and concepts not appropriate or feasible in an educational setting.65  Others 
argued that the 2018 regulations were too concerned with protecting the accused.66  In contrast, 
advocates for individual rights in education and other organizations, such as the American Civil 
Liberties Union (“ACLU”), ultimately praised the DOE’s focus on student due process rights and 
shift to live hearings with cross-examination procedures.67  
While universities, key advocacy groups, and policymakers grappled (and continue to grapple) 
with the relationship between student due process rights and Title IX protections in light of the 
 
61 2018 Press Release, supra note 1.  
62 Id. 
63 See Hallie Busta, Ed. Dept.’s Title IX Proposal Gets 100k Public Comments, EDUCATIONDIVE (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://www.educationdive.com/news/ed-depts-title-ix-proposal-gets-100k-public-comments/547414/. 
64 Id. (stating that the proposed Title IX “rewrite” is “the most controversial regulatory undertaking” in the DOE’s 
history). 
65 Letter from the American Council on Education, to Betsy DeVos, Secretary of the Department of Education (Jan. 
30, 2019) (on file with author) (stating that “[c]olleges and universities are not law enforcement agencies or courts,” 
and that the proposed regulations rely “on formal legal procedures and concepts” that are “wildly inappropriate and 
infeasible in an educational setting”) [hereinafter American Council on Education Letter].  
66 See Laura Meckler, Devos Set to Bolster Rights of Accused in Title IX Cases, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://beta.washingtonpost.com/local/education/betsy-devos-set-to-bolster-rights-of-accused-in-rewrite-of-sexual-
assault-rules/2018/11/14/828ebd9c-e7d1-11e8-a939-9469f1166f9d_story.html; Erica L. Green, Sex Assault Rules 
Under DeVos Bolster Defandants' Rights and Ease College Liability , N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2018) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/16/us/politics/betsy-devos-title-ix.html. 
67 See American Council on Education Letter, supra note 65 (“While the ACLU supports live hearings and cross-
examination in the university context, it believes the cross-examination right would be substantially improved 
if…modified in several respects to further ensure equity and to prevent abuse.”). 
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DOE’s 2018 changes, two circuits delivered important and conflicting opinions that offer key 
insight into the debate.   
III. The Conflicting Holdings of Baum and Haidak 
 
This Section will analyze the conflicting holdings of Baum and Haidak.  It will provide 
factual background on both cases, highlight the key reasoning of both opinions, and explain how 
each decision was received.  
A. Factual Background on the Baum Decision 
In Baum, John Doe and Jane Roe were students at the University of Michigan attending a 
fraternity party.68  At the party, Doe and Roe drank alcohol, danced, and had sexual intercourse.69  
Two days later, Roe filed a sexual misconduct complaint claiming that she was too intoxicated to 
consent to sexual intercourse.70  Having sexual intercourse with an incapacitated person violated 
the university’s policies, and consequently, the university launched an investigation.71  The 
school’s investigator collected evidence and interviewed Doe and Roe, as well as twenty-three 
other witnesses.72  
The investigator concluded that the relevant question, whether Roe was too intoxicated to 
consent during the encounter, could not be addressed based on the evidence and recommended 
that the administration rule in Doe’s favor.73  Roe appealed the decision and a three-member panel 
reviewed the investigator’s report.74  After two closed sessions (no new evidence was introduced 
 
68 Baum, 903 F.3d at 578. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 579. 
71 Id. at 578.  
72 Id.  
73 Baum, 903 F.3d at 580. 
74 Id. 
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nor were students interviewed), the panel reversed the decision.75  The panel found Roe’s 
description of events “more credible” and Roe’s witnesses “more persuasive.”76  Facing the  
possibility of expulsion, Doe agreed to withdraw from the university.77  
Doe subsequently filed a lawsuit claiming that the university’s disciplinary proceedings 
violated the Due Process Clause and Title IX.78  Doe argued that because the university’s decision 
turned on a credibility finding, the school was required to give him a hearing with an opportunity 
to cross-examine Roe and adverse witnesses.79  The university filed a motion to dismiss, which 
the district court granted and Doe appealed.80 
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Opinion and Reasoning 
In evaluating Doe’s appeal, the court first emphasized that the “opportunity to be heard” is 
the “Constitutional minimum.”81  The court noted that determining what “being heard” looks like 
requires a balancing of the parties’ competing interests, citing the Mathews and Goss opinions.82  
The court turned to its own decisions, outlining that in the context of universities, if a student is 
accused of misconduct, the university must hold some sort of hearing before imposing a serious 
sanction like expulsion or suspension.83  Similarly, when the university’s determination turns on 
the credibility of the accuser, the accused, or witnesses, the hearing must include an opportunity 
for cross-examination.84  The court described cross-examination as the “greatest legal engine” for 
 
75 Id.  
76 Id.  
77 Id. at 578. 
78 Baum, 903 F.3d at 578.   
79 Id.  
80 Id.   
81 Id. at 581.  
82 Id. 
83 Id.  
84 Baum, 903 F.3d at 581.  
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“uncovering the truth,” and consequently, if a university’s decision turns on credibility, the hearing 
must include an opportunity for cross-examination in order to satisfy due process.85  
Because Doe never received an opportunity to cross-examine Roe or adverse witnesses, 
the court reasoned that there was a serious risk that the university “erroneously deprived Doe of 
his protected interests.”86  The court continued to emphasize the importance of cross-examination 
in credibility determinations and noted that it would be feasible for the university to facilitate cross-
examination procedures.87  The court stated that Doe’s interests were also significant, as being 
labeled a sex offender carries severe consequences, and therefore, Doe was entitled to respond to 
his accuser’s allegations.88 
The court was not persuaded by the university’s argument  that Doe was “heard” because 
he was permitted to review Roe’s statement and submit a response identifying inconsistencies and 
therefore, there would have been “no added benefit to cross-examination.”89  The court explained, 
“[w]ithout the back-and-forth of adversarial questioning, the accused cannot probe the witness’s 
story to test her memory, intelligence, or potential ulterior motives. Nor can the fact-finder observe 
the witness’s demeanor under that questioning.”90  The court did, however, explain that the accused 
may not always have a right to personally confront his or her accuser.91  The court articulated that 
universities have a legitimate interest in avoiding procedures that subject an alleged victim to 
further harm or harassment, and allowing the accused to cross-examine his or her accuser could 
 
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 582.  
87 Baum, 903 F.3d at 582. 
88 Id. 
89 Id.  
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 583.  
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cause such harm.92 The court proposed that instead of denying cross-examination, universities 
could allow the accused’s agent to conduct cross-examination.93 
C. Responses to the Baum Decision 
The Baum decision was significant because it was the second decision in which the Sixth 
Circuit ruled that students facing sexual misconduct charges at university disciplinary hearings 
were entitled to cross-examine their accusers.94 Previously, in Doe v. University of Cincinnati, the 
Sixth Circuit held that a university student facing allegations of sexual assault is permitted to 
confront his or her accuser at a disciplinary hearing.95  Therefore, within the Sixth Circuit, college 
administrators who deny students the right of cross-examination in future disciplinary proceedings 
can be held personally liable for violating a “well-established constitutional right.”96  
Critics highlighted that the decision left “open” who would conduct such cross-
examinations and how they would be conducted.97  Further, critics noted that the decision failed 
to define the scope of the required hearing or adversarial proceeding, as prior case law 
demonstrates that a “full-scale” adversarial hearing for school disciplinary proceedings is not 
 
92 Baum, 903 F.3d at 583.   
93 Id.  
94 Richard Fossey and Todd A. DeMitchell, Doe v. Baum: The Sixth Circuit Reiterates that Students Accused of 
Sexual Assault Are Constitutionally Entitled to Confront their Accusers at University Title IX Disciplinary Hearings, 




95 Richard Fossey and Todd A. DeMitchell, Doe v. Baum: The Sixth Circuit Reiterates that Students Accused of 
Sexual Assault Are Constitutionally Entitled to Confront their Accusers at University Title IX Disciplinary Hearings, 




96 Id. See Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, A Potential Title IX Supreme Court Case?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 8, 2019), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/08/08/ruling-umass-amherst-title-ix-lawsuit-may-lead-supreme-court-
case-experts-say (“Experts in Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972…heralded the opinion as a 
reformation of due process in such cases, at least among the collection of Midwestern states the Sixth Circuit 
encompasses. The Sixth Circuit is becoming known for producing more radical opinions in Title IX cases that have 
made waves among lawyers and college administrators.”). 
97 Id.  
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required to satisfy due process.98 After the Baum decision, legal advisors warned that education 
institutions that did not provide hearings or cross-examination for sexual misconduct matters faced 
a “heightened risk of adverse findings in due process and Title IX erroneous outcome claims.”99 
Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit’s ruling appeared consistent with the DOE’s increased focus 
on due process protections in its 2018 regulations.100  Because of this, legal advisors warned that 
universities should not consider the Baum decision an “outlier, but rather as consistent with the 
national trend toward requiring additional due process in Title IX proceedings.”101  Further, legal 
experts noted that the Baum decision affects Title IX practices at more than forty state colleges and 
universities in Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee, and Kentucky, and the decision would likely influence 
other courts considering similar cases.102  
Additionally, many policymakers argued that the opinion was overly concerned with the 
rights of accused students.103  Critics emphasized that adversarial questioning might discourage 
victims of sexual assault and sexual harassment from coming forward and would also discourage 
witnesses from testifying on behalf of accusers.104  Essentially, the decision was “framed as a 
victory for the accused in cases of sexual assault.”105   
D. Factual Background on the Haidak Decision 
 
98 Id.  
99 Id. 
100 Id.  
101 Id. See Editorial Board, Due Process for Sexual Assault Cases; The Sixth Circuit Says the Accused have a Right 
to Cross-Examination, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 13, 2018), 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/2103234858/citation/2D68495DA2A4382PQ/1?accountid=13793 (“The ruling 
also adds legal credence to Education Secretary Besty DeVos's effort to restore due process in Title IX proceedings. 
Michigan hasn't said if it will appeal, but the Supreme Court is overdue for a case on how universities adjudicate 
sexual assault.”). 
102 Editorial Board, Due Process for Sexual Assault Cases; The Sixth Circuit Says the Accused have a Right to 
Cross-Examination, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 13, 2018). 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/2103234858/citation/2D68495DA2A4382PQ/1?accountid=1379 3. 
103 Michigan Daily Editorial Board, From the Daily: The Problems of Cross-Examination, MICHIGAN DAILY (Sept. 
16, 2018), https://www.michigandaily.com/section/editorials/daily-problems-cross-examination. 
104 Id.  
105 Id.  
 17 
After Baum, the First Circuit issued an opinion considering the same issue.106  In Haidak, 
James Haidak and Lauren Gibney were students at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst 
who had been in a tumultuous relationship since 2012.107  When studying abroad in Barcelona, 
Haidak and Gibney engaged in an argument that turned physical.108  According to Gibney, Haidak 
put his hand around her neck, pushed her onto the bed, hurt her by squeezing various pressure 
points, and grabbed her wrists and punched himself in the face with her fists.109  Later that day, 
Gibney’s mother called the university to report that Haidak had physically assaulted Gibney.110  
Gibney followed up three days later by submitting a written report of the incident.111  The 
university initiated an investigation.112  
The university gave Haidak notice of Gibney’s allegations and issued a no-contact order.  
Haidak denied the allegations, and both parties resumed contact with each other.113  Later, Haidak 
and Gibney had an argument when Haidak arrived a bar where Gibney worked and positioned 
himself uncomfortably close to Gibney until security removed him.114  Subsequently, Gibney 
obtained a restraining order against Haidak.115  The university offered Haidak a date for a hearing 
and sent a handout describing hearing procedures.116  The procedures allowed for Haidak to submit 
questions for the Board to consider when questioning the complainant and witnesses.117 Haidak 
submitted thirty-six questions, which the Assistant Dean of Students, Patricia Cardoso, pared down 
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to sixteen.118  Haidak and Cardoso discussed the evidence that Haidak wished to present to the 
hearing board.119 
During the hearing, four students and one staff member considered Haidak’s charges.120 
Gibney attended in person, while Haidak phoned in and Haidak’s attorney observed.121  Two 
university advisors were also appointed to both Haidak and Gibney, and both were present at the 
hearing.122  The hearing board asked questions to both Haidak and Gibney, examining each student 
three times.123  Of the questions the board asked Gibney, none were worded identically to those 
proposed by Haidak, but were designed to elicit the same information.124  Ultimately, the board 
found that Haidak’s behavior was “disproportionate to the actions he attributed to Gibney” and 
that Haidak caused physical harm to Gibney based on the “narratives and pictures presented  
in the hearing.”125 
After reviewing the board’s finding and Haidak’s disciplinary history (which included two 
prior violations of the university’s student code of conduct), the Associate Dean of Students, David 
Vaillancourt, decided expulsion was necessary.126  Haidak appealed and the university’s appeals 
board recommended that Vaillancourt’s sanction be upheld.127  Haidak then filed a two-count 
complaint against the university and the officials involved, alleging due process, equal protection, 
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and Title IX violations.128  The district court dismissed Haidak’s procedural due process 
challenges.129 
E. The First Circuit’s Opinion and Reasoning 
The First Circuit articulated that it was not evaluating whether Haidak’s hearing mirrored  
a common law trial, but whether Haidak had an “opportunity to answer, explain, and defend.”130  
Haidak argued that due process requires the accused or the accused’s representative to question 
opposing witnesses directly whenever a disciplinary proceeding turns on the witnesses’ 
credibility.131  The court noted that the university did not implement an adversarial model in its 
truth-seeking, but rather, an inquisitorial model.132  The court explained, contrary to Haidak’s 
argument, that the inquisitorial model is not considered inadequate in all settings, noting that the 
inquisitorial model of truth-seeking is often used in critical administrative decisions, such as 
whether to award or terminate disability benefits.133 
Further, the court emphasized that students do not have a right to legal counsel in school 
disciplinary hearings, which Haidak did not allege, and therefore, the court explained Haidak’s 
position “would seem to be that the accused student must be allowed to question opposing 
witnesses himself.”134  Here, the court noted that “schools may reasonably fear that student-
conducted cross-examination will lead to displays of acrimony or worse.”135  The court referenced 
guidance from the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, which recommends that in 
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sexual misconduct matters, or any matter that turns on credibility, there is some opportunity for 
“real-time” cross-examination and that a “hearing panel is sufficient.”136  
In considering the holding in Baum, the court agreed with the Sixth Circuit and found the 
“complete absence of any examination before the factfinder is procedurally deficient.”137 
However, the court emphasized that the Sixth Circuit took “the conclusion one step further than 
we care to go, announcing a categorical rule that the state school had to provide for cross-
examination by the accused or his representative in all cases turning on credibility. . . .”138  The 
court found that questioning a complaining witness by a neutral party is not so “. . . fundamentally 
flawed as to create a categorically unacceptable risk of erroneous deprivation” and that “student 
disciplinary proceedings need not mirror common law trials.”139  Further, the First Circuit noted 
the possibility for a “slippery slope” of universities holding jury trials in implementing the Baum 
holding.140 
After determining that the questioning model utilized by the university, where a panel 
conducted multiple rounds of questioning of parties and witnesses, was constitutionally sufficient, 
the court evaluated whether the school conducted “reasonably adequate questioning.”141  The court 
found that in Haidak’s case, this was a “close question.”142  After reviewing the school’s manual 
and directions for its hearing board and evaluating Haidak’s actual hearing,143 the court found that 
both Haidak and Gibney were questioned in real-time, and both parties, particularly Gibney, were 




138 Id.  
139 Haidak, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 23482, at *25. 
140 Id. at *26.  
141 Haidak, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 23482, at *26. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at *27. 
144 Id. 
 21 
analysis, the court also looked to the “probative value” of the hearing board’s questions and held 
that the board conducted a hearing that was reasonably calculated to get to the truth by allowing 
Haidak to be heard after Gibney testified and examining Gibney in a “manner reasonably 
calculated to expose any relevant flaws in her claims.”145 
F. Responses to the Haidak Decision 
The decision generated mixed responses regarding its departure from the Baum holding.146  
Some responses have highlighted that the First Circuit agreed with the Sixth Circuit that cross-
examination should be mandated in some form in sexual misconduct hearings at universities, and 
thus, the split may be one of degree.147  Other sources noted that the circuit spilt will create 
confusion and complexity for universities as case law differs and regulations are in “flux.”148  
Consequently, litigation will inevitably arise.149  Finally, experts explained that while the split is 
“dramatic,” until other cases work through court systems across the country, universities will not 
know whether the Sixth Circuit opinion is more of an outlier or the standard.150  Colleges and 
universities have largely followed a model similar to the one the First Circuit endorsed in Haidak, 
as under current DOE regulations there is ambiguity over how a hearing or proceeding should be 
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As for the Haidak decision, many questioned what the court meant by “reasonably 
calculated” questioning and criticized the ruling as unclear.152  One expert explained that because 
the “reasonably calculated” standard is ambiguous, it is likely that the decision will lead to “a lot 
of litigation over whether the school-conducted questioning in any given case was sufficient.”153 
Essentially, as universities wait for the 2018 regulations to be finalized, the contentious opinions 
in Baum and Haidak have created additional complexity and confusion for Title IX administrators.  
IV. The Haidak Opinion: A Fair Process for Sexual Misconduct Adjudications 
 
This Section will first argue that the Haidak decision meets procedural due process 
standards because the Constitution does not require university disciplinary proceedings to be 
modeled after common law trials and include procedural due process protections such as live cross-
examination.  Next, it will outline the ways in which the Haidak decision mitigates current tension 
around facilitating fair sexual misconduct proceedings as well as recognizes a university’s interest 
in maintaining consistent, feasible procedures and most importantly, protecting victims of sexual 
assault and harassment.  
A. The Haidak Decision Meets Procedural Due Process Standards Under the Constitution  
In evaluating the due process procedures required in a non-criminal matter, such as 
university disciplinary proceedings, courts follow the Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews v. 
Eldridge. In Mathews, the Supreme Court held that the process that is due depends largely on 
context and three factors: (1) what is at stake for the person; (2) how risky it is under the current 
procedures for the person to be wrongly punished and how likely is it that safeguards would reduce 
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that risk; and (3) how costly and time consuming the new protections would be for the 
government.154 
The Mathews framework is recognized as the “universal analysis federal courts use when 
determining the extent and the type of notice, and what additional procedural requirements apply 
in different situations.”155 Courts have applied the Mathews framework in a variety of contexts to 
determine what kind of due process is required.156 For example, in Cleveland Board of Education 
v. Loudermill, the Supreme Court found that due process required a school board to provide a 
“limited pre-termination hearing” before the discharge of an employee followed by a “post-
termination” hearing in which an employee could challenge the discharge.157 Further, the Court 
has applied the  Mathews framework in claims regarding government benefits and services,158 
family rights matters,159  children’s rights matters,160 prisoners’ rights matters,161 creditors’ 
claims,162 and forfeiture proceedings.163 Essentially, the Mathews framework recognizes that 
notice and the opportunity to be heard can be satisfied “with less detailed and less formal 
proceedings than in the criminal context” and there is not a categorical rule that governs every 
situation.164 This is particularly true in the school discipline context.  
In school discipline matters, following the Mathews analysis, the Supreme Court has found 
that schools are not “a courtroom”165 and like other non-criminal matters, procedural due process 
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may involve less detailed and formal procedures. The Supreme Court followed the Mathews 
framework in its first major holding on students’ due process rights in Goss v. Lopez.166 The 
Court’s holding in Goss emphasized that a school is not required to model its disciplinary 
proceedings after common law trials.167  For example, students do not have a right to legal counsel 
and due process procedures are subject to university discretion.168  The Goss opinion does, 
however, require that schools provide accused students with notice and “some kind of hearing.”169  
The Court noted that more “formal” procedures might be required for more serious disciplinary 
cases, but did not clarify what more “formal” procedures would be required, or the types of 
“serious” cases that would warrant them.170  Despite the serious nature of sexual misconduct 
allegations, Title IX regulations have historically recognized the Goss holding as granting 
universities flexibility in designing and executing sexual misconduct proceedings.171  
However, the 2018 regulations seek to restrict much of the flexibility given to universities 
in designing their disciplinary proceedings, specifically, by requiring live cross-examination by 
parties or their representatives.172 However, the requirement of live cross-examination conflicts 
with federal law and in particular, the Court’s decision in Goss.173 In order to further understand 
why live cross-examination by parties or their representatives is not constitutionally necessary in 
university disciplinary proceedings, it is helpful to explore post-Goss jurisprudence related to 
student procedural due process rights. A month after the Goss decision, the Court focused on 
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substantive due process in the context of a student’s civil rights claim.174 The Court held that school 
officials are “entitled to qualified good faith immunity from liability for money damages…unless 
they knew or reasonably should have known that their actions would violate the constitutional 
rights of the affected student.”175 The Court articulated that it was not the role of the federal 
government to set aside decisions of school administrators, even if the court viewed those decisions 
as “lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.”176 The Court clarified that students (in this case 
public high school students) do have procedural and substantive rights while at school, but these 
rights are limited.177  The Court’s decision in Goss and Woods demonstrate the Court’s deference 
to school officials in creating fair policies and procedures for disciplinary matters.  
In Haidak, the court held that university sexual misconduct proceedings must include a 
hearing where witnesses are cross-examined, but that such cross-examination could be executed 
by a panel or hearing board.178  These procedural requirements are constitutionally sufficient, 
aligned with Goss and post-Goss jurisprudence, and provide the opportunity for a “back and forth” 
demanded by advocates of student due process rights. Both the court in Baum and the 2018 
regulations require cross-examination to be conducted by parties or their representatives,179 and 
many advocates of student due process rights reason that such a categorical rule is necessary 
because anything less is unconstitutional.180 However, this assertion is false and distracts from 
decades of constitutional precedent. In her article, “Misrepresenting Well-Settled Jurisprudence: 
 
174 Lisa Swem, Lecture at 2017 School Law Seminar Council of School Attorneys (Mar. 23 2000). See Wood v. 
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).  
175 Wood, 420 U.S. at 326. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Haidak, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 23482, at *26.  
179 Baum, 903 F.3d at 578; 2018 Press Release, supra note 1. 
180 Editorial Board, Due Process for Sexual Assault Cases; The Sixth Circuit Says the Accused have a Right to 
Cross-Examination, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 13, 2018). 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/2103234858/citation/2D68495DA2A4382PQ/1?accountid=13793. 
 26 
Peddling ‘Due Process’ Clause Fallacies to Justify Gutting Title IX Protections for Girls and 
Women,” Penny Venetis notes that the 2018 regulations give the Baum decision “great authority” 
and in doing so, the DOE has “abdicated its duties...towards students who have been sexually 
assaulted and harassed, in favor of students who have been accused of sexual abuse.”181 Venetis 
explains that providing the accused with cross-examination tools that courts have “summarily 
rejected for decades” irresponsibly departs from “well-settled case law.”182  
The procedural requirements for cross-examination outlined in Haidak better balance the 
constitutional flexibility universities have historically held in structuring sexual misconduct 
hearings and the need for some type of cross-examination in such hearings. Therefore, the court in 
Haidak presents a useful model for universities as they facilitate questioning procedures in sexual 
misconduct proceedings. 
B. The Haidak Decision Offers a Solution to the Administrative Burden of Modeling University 
Adjudication Procedures after Common Law Trials 
Under various revisions of Title IX regulations, in cases of sexual misconduct, universities 
were required to provide students with notice and “some type of” hearing, but such procedures did 
not need to follow the procedural due process requirements of common law trials.183  However, as 
accused students increasingly brought suits alleging violations of their due process rights, courts 
were forced to evaluate whether Title IX regulations adequately ensured that university sexual 
misconduct proceedings protected student due process rights.184  The 2018 regulations and the 
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Sixth Circuit’s decision in Baum have reinvigorated this controversy, forcing courts and 
universities to grapple with whether university disciplinary proceedings must offer the same due 
process rights granted in common law trials, specifically, live cross-examination by a party or a 
party’s representative—a change that would require many universities to overhaul their 
disciplinary proceedings.  Here, the First Circuit’s decision in Haidak offers a workable solution 
that acknowledges a student’s right to be heard, but also considers the administrative burden many 
universities would face if following the 2018 regulations and the Baum decision. 
First, modeling university due process procedures, specifically cross-examination 
procedures, after common law trials could lead to a host of issues, from administrative efficiency 
to student safety.185  If a university proceeding were to be modeled after a criminal or civil model, 
the university would face obstacles in its primary goal of ensuring that students’ education is 
prioritized by effectively and efficiently responding to student sexual misconduct allegations.186  
Mandatory adversarial processes “superimpose a high conflict procedure onto a non-adversarial 
community and system.”187 
In the Goss decision, the Court recognized the administrative burden schools might face if 
required to implement formal due process procedures, such as live cross-examination.188 The Court 
articulated that “even truncated trial-type procedures might well overwhelm administrative 
facilities.”189 The Court explained that facilitating procedures such as live cross-examination with 
counsel would inevitably lead schools to divert resources and increase expenses without 
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necessarily improving the effectiveness of the disciplinary proceeding.190 While permitting a party 
or a party’s representative to engage in cross-examination might appear to relieve a university or 
school of its responsibility to adjudicate a disciplinary matter, such changes would “fundamentally 
change the system and render it less accessible to students.”191 First, adding counsel to represent a 
student and facilitate cross-examination would complicate proceedings by “importing outside legal 
rules based on adversarial systems.”192 Students (as under the 2018 regulations students may 
facilitate cross-examination) and educational institutions would need to learn these “outside legal 
rules,” which would require significant training and consultation.193  In addition, cross-
examination often prolongs hearings and consequently, adds administrative costs.194 Further, 
cross-examination frequently “devolves into a mini-trail of extrinsic evidence and character 
witnesses because of the impeachment threat that accompanies cross-examination.”195  
Thus, in the university setting, it is the university’s responsibility rather than the parties’ to  
investigate the facts.196  This system of adjudication and cross-examination is labeled 
“inquisitorial” and does not involve the administrative demands of an adversarial model.197 Under 
the First Circuit’s holding in Haidak, an inquisitorial model would require universities to facilitate 
a “back and forth” form of questioning that is “reasonably calculated” to uncover the truth.198 
Additionally, neither students nor student representatives would be permitted to engage in 
questioning or cross-examination, reducing the likelihood of contentious and potentially damaging 
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hearings. 199 The First Circuit’s articulation of an inquisitorial model, when designed and executed 
effectively, is more conducive to the university setting than cross-examination procedures modeled 
after common law trials. 
As evidenced by many student lawsuits and general concern about student due process 
rights, however, the inquisitorial model used by many universities should be adapted to ensure that 
both the accused and accuser in sexual misconduct cases have a chance to present their case and 
respond to allegations.200  The First Circuit’s holding in Haidak offers important insight into this 
issue. The First Circuit’s decision, through its holding regarding cross-examination procedures, 
seems to fairly balance the right of an accused student to be heard, but also the university’s interest 
in regulating itself and ensuring that sexual misconduct is handled effectively.  
While the First Circuit provides universities with flexibility in designing questioning 
procedures, it does require such questioning to meet a standard of “reasonably adequate 
questioning.”201  Clarification is needed over what “reasonably adequate” questioning looks like 
so that universities can properly protect victims from re-traumatization while also ensuring an 
accused student is heard. The First Circuit’s lack of clarity could lead to inconsistent procedures 
and continuing litigation and controversy.  Thus, using aspects of the opinion, courts, 
policymakers, and universities should outline what “reasonably adequate questioning” looks like.  
The First Circuit found that the university conducted “reasonably adequate questioning” 
because both parties were permitted to submit questions to the hearing panel and the hearing panel 
questioned both Gibney and Haidak multiple times.202  Therefore, it seems that questioning 
procedures should provide students with input and ensure that students respond to questions 
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multiple times. Particularly, the First Circuit found that witnesses should be asked the same 
question multiple times to determine if a witness’s response is consistent.203 University 
administrators or factfinders should also ask follow-up questions as appropriate and provide the 
accused with multiple opportunities to respond to a complainant’s responses.204 Ideally, the 2018 
regulations would adopt the First Circuit’s holding, as it acknowledges that while students are not 
constitutionally entitled to a live hearing, there is a need to reform what due process looks like at 
the university level in sexual misconduct matters.  However, the regulations should further clarify 
factors that contribute to “reasonably adequate questioning.”   
The First Circuit’s holding in Haidak provides schools with a degree of autonomy on how 
hearings are structured, as well as who at the university facilitates the proceeding.205  The Sixth 
Circuit’s categorical rule that demands cross-examination by an accused or the accused’s 
representative is indicative of procedural requirements that create a  trial-like proceeding that may 
burden university administrations, especially universities with less resources.206  The decision in 
Haidak will not eliminate university concerns around resources and training, but it will provide 
schools the opportunity to revamp current structures instead of overhauling them.  
C. The Haidak Decision Considers the Re-traumatization of Victims 
The First Circuit decision also accounts for the trauma that victims may experience if 
subjected to questioning by their attacker, or highly adversarial questioning in general. Critics of 
the Sixth Circuit’s decision in  Baum and the 2018 regulations argue that victims will be “re-
traumatized” and less likely to report sexual misconduct if subjected to the “trial-like” procedures 
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outlined in Baum and by the DOE.207  Therefore, the First Circuit’s opinion leaves flexibility in 
structuring hearings so that universities can ensure victims are protected and encouraged to report 
sexual misconduct when it occurs.  
First, the decision in Baum and the 2018 regulations seek to shift the focus of Title IX from 
ensuring victims have rights to an education free from sexual harassment to protections for accused 
students.208 This departure will likely exacerbate the underreporting of sexual harassment and 
abuse that is already rampant within the university setting.209 The National Sexual Violence 
Resource Center reports that about 90% of sexual assault victims on college campuses do not 
report their assaults.210 If students fear confrontation from their harasser or their harasser’s 
representative, they will be less likely to report, especially if they feel they will not be believed. 
Student victims are less likely to report sexual assaults if such reporting leads to a courtroom-like 
proceeding, and “some evidence suggests that fear of cross-examination may be the primary 
driving force behind underreporting in the criminal justice system.”211 The 2018 regulations create 
obstacles for students reporting sexual abuse and such obstacles are contrary to the intent of Title 
IX. 
Essentially, adversarial cross-examination is inappropriate in the university setting. 
University proceedings are not criminal proceedings, and while adversarial cross-examination 
has benefits, it is likely to contribute to underreporting of sexual assault at universities and the 
re-traumatization of student victims. Cross-examination questioning does not always seek to 
advance truth-seeking, but rather, functions as a means to intimidate or discredit a victim.212 
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Further, strategic cross-examiners can ask questions about impermissible topics or “make the 
same insinuations through permissible questioning.”213 For example, in a cross-examination of a 
rape victim, an advocate will address questions of consent and “grill the victim about the details 
of her behavior, attitudes and attire on the night of the attack...The lawyer must characterize 
every detail vividly from the most salacious point of view attainable and present it all with 
maximum innuendo.”214  
Adversarial and aggressive cross-examination harms a victim. Many victims of sexual 
harassment and assault are severely traumatized by the crime and must undergo that trauma 
again in court. Moreover, many advocates seek to exculpate the accused by addressing 
“factfinders’ preexisting beliefs and stereotypes about what ‘real’ assault looks like.”215 Victims 
may be asked questions such as, “Did you resist?” or “Why didn’t you go to the police right 
after?” Such questions “reinforce oppressive social norms and leave many victims feeling 
partially responsible for the harm done to them.”216 If student victims fear trial-like procedures 
and fail to report instances of sexual misconduct, sexual harassment persists and universities not 
only fail to deter instances of sexual harassment but fail to protect student victims. The 
questioning procedures outlined by the First Circuit in Haidak provide the accused student with a 
chance to participate in questioning, but also ensure student complainants are protected. 
The inquisitorial model articulated by the First Circuit in Haidak decreases the trauma a 
complainant experiences while testifying as a neutral panel ensures questioning is not abusive. In 
a courtroom setting, even the “most attentive arbiters cannot censor all abusive questions, so by 
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allowing a panel to censor or change questions” the inquisitorial model ensures abusive and 
adversarial questioning is precluded.217 A neutral party can also control the length of the 
proceeding and prevent victims from “excessively long proceedings.”218 
Universities should develop a mechanism for cross-examination, but this should not 
involve the accused or his or her representative because a neutral third-party is constitutionally 
adequate, provides universities with needed flexibility, and decreases the potential for a victim to 
experience additional emotional trauma. 
V. Conclusion 
Despite current Title IX regulations, litigation continues to arise over due process rights in 
sexual misconduct cases at the university level.  Consequently, the First Circuit’s decision in 
Haidak should be leveraged to guide policymakers and universities in developing fair processes 
that protect an accused’s due process rights, but also do not overburden university administrations, 
and more importantly, do not re-traumatize victims or discourage victims from seeking redress. 
Haidak should guide legal advisors and policymakers as they continue to advise 
universities on best practices to ensure due process is satisfied and campus sexual misconduct is 
handled effectively.  As Title IX regulations continue to be revised, the Haidak opinion should 
maintain relevancy in conversations surrounding how sexual misconduct is handled at the 
university level.  
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